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▪ Additionality remains a key concept even in the Paris Agreement context where all 
countries contribute to mitigation. Safeguarding additionality prevents undermining 
of the global mitigation ambition by spurious emissions credits as well as creating 
risks to NDC achievement due to the sale of ‘low hanging fruit’. Particular attention 
needs to be put on developing workable approaches for assessing additionality of 
activities that aim at the introduction of mitigation policy instruments. Three ‘shades’ 
of additionality – financial, regulatory and target – need to be considered. A clear 
distinction needs to be made between (ex-ante) additionality and (ex-post) vulnera-
bility of an activity. 
▪ Baseline determination under Article 6 needs to be aligned with NDC targets in the 
short term and with the target to reach net zero emissions in the long term. This 
means that existing and planned mitigation policies need to be taken into account in 
baseline determination. Consistency with long-term targets can be achieved through 
simple means like a discount factor or ‘ambition coefficient’ applied to baseline emis-
sions intensity. Pure business-as-usual baselines are no longer acceptable. Perfor-
mance benchmarks, including best available technology approaches, can only be ap-
plied in certain sectors. 
▪ Compared to the Kyoto Mechanisms, developing countries wanting to participate in 
Article 6 as ITMO sellers need a significant upgrade of their capacity. This is necessary 
to enable informed decisions regarding additionality and baseline approaches when 
approving activities and authorising ITMO transfers. The former should be aligned 
with approaches used under NDC development and could include positive lists. 
▪
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Market-based mechanisms as a climate policy instrument strive for environmental integrity, 
which is understood as “a situation where the individual elements or mechanisms of an over-
arching instrument do not undermine the (environmental) goals of this instrument” 
(Hermwille and Obergassel 2018, p. 4-5). Ensuring the environmental integrity of market-
based cooperation means ensuring that such cooperation contributes to global mitigation ef-
forts, and at the very least does not lead to a net increase in global greenhouse gas (GHG) 
emissions compared to a situation without market-based cooperation. 
In this paper, we focus on market-based cooperation relating to baseline-and-credit schemes, 
which credit (i.e. issue carbon credits for) mitigation outcomes against a baseline, in accord-
ance with the scheme’s criteria and rules. Robust additionality testing and setting crediting 
baselines are core elements for ensuring the environmental integrity of baseline-and-credit 
schemes. If mitigation outcomes (emission reductions and removals) are not additional and/or 
are credited against an invalid baseline, the use of such mitigation outcomes for mitigation 
purposes would undermine, rather than promote, the achievement of mitigation goals.  
Additionality testing and baseline setting are operationalised by methodologies which provide 
guidance on: setting the baseline against which mitigation outcomes are quantified; testing 
additionality of an activity; quantifying an activity’s emissions/leakage and resulting mitigation 
outcomes; and detail requirements for monitoring, data management and reporting proce-
dures. 
Due to their critical role, methodological approaches to additionality testing and baseline set-
ting have been heavily scrutinised and contested since the emergence of international base-
line-and-credit schemes over two decades ago. They are easy targets for criticism and ques-
tioning since, by their very nature, they rely on counterfactual assumptions on what would 
happen without the mitigation activity (Michaelowa et al. 2019). Current methodological ap-
proaches for additionality testing and baseline setting embody decades of extensive efforts 
by the international carbon market community in their development, application and revision, 
most notably under the Kyoto Protocol’s (KP) Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) (see 
Michaelowa 2009 for an account how additionality tests have been developed under the 
CDM). Many baseline-and-credit schemes recognise and build on approaches developed un-
der the CDM, and have also developed their own approaches for specific contexts.  
In this paper, we explore the development of methodologies for additionality testing and 
baseline setting under Article 6 of the Paris Agreement (PA). Voluntary market-based cooper-
ation under Article 6, which includes baseline-and-credit schemes, helps countries in the im-
plementation of their Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) to allow for higher ambi-
tion in their mitigation actions and to promote sustainable development and environmental 
integrity.  
Specific considerations for methodologies in the context of Article 6 of the PA are that they 
need to be designed to promote mitigation ambition, safeguard the contribution of activities 
to Parties’ NDCs and contribute to an overall mitigation in global emissions. In this paper, ‘Ar-
ticle 6 methodologies’ refers to methodologies that are aligned with the requirements under 
Article 6, including guidance on international transfers of mitigation outcomes under Article 
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6.2 and the rules, modalities and procedures (RMPs) of the international Article 6.4 Mecha-
nism (A6.4M). As of June 2021, the rules and requirements for Article 6 were still under nego-
tiation. They are due to be adopted at the UN climate conference in Glasgow (COP26) in No-
vember 2021.  
This paper summarises the discussions on Article 6 methodologies for additionality testing and 
baseline setting that took place in the context of the Carbon Market Mechanisms Working 
Group (CMM-WG) in the first half of 2021. The CMM-WG focuses on baseline-and-credit ap-
proaches under Article 6 of the PA, and does not address other types of international market-
based cooperation under Article 6, such as the linking of emission trading systems.  
Specifically, this paper presents key insights from the two technical workshops that took place 
in March and May 2021, on Article 6 methodologies and on host country oversight on Article 
6 methodologies, respectively. In addition, the paper discusses the key results of a survey on 
additionality testing and baseline setting methodologies conducted between 9 March 2021 
and 30 April 2021 (see Annex I for questionnaire). In total, 68 people participated in the sur-
vey, of whom 57.4% indicated a high level of expertise on carbon markets (see Annex II for full 
summary).  
This paper serves as input to international discussions on additionality testing and baseline 
setting in the context of baseline-and-credit approaches under Article 6 of the PA. It seeks to 
provide an overview of key issues which are currently discussed among experts, to reflect on 
the implications of different concepts’ operationalisation and to identify further research 
needs. 
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. First, we introduce the key concepts of addition-
ality and baselines, and the climate policy contexts under the KP and the PA. Then, we provide 
an overview of the evolution of key methodological approaches to date and explore their ro-
bust application in the context of the PA and its Article 6. Specifically, we consider how meth-
odologies for additionality testing and baseline setting can be aligned with Article 6 require-
ments and net-zero emissions pathways consistent with the PA’s long-term goals, while re-
specting countries’ different responsibilities and respective capabilities.  
2. Setting the scene: Key concepts and contexts 
2.1. Key concepts: Additionality and baselines 
For a mitigation activity to be deemed additional, it needs to be demonstrated that the activity 
would not have happened ‘anyway’, that is, without support from carbon market cooperation 
(Michaelowa 2009). Additionality testing thus aims to ensure that only real mitigation out-
comes that require carbon market support are credited under baseline-and-credit schemes 
(Michaelowa et al. 2019). For the assessment of an activity’s additionality, baseline (also re-
ferred to as ‘reference’) and activity scenarios are developed to assess whether the activity 
scenario differs from the baseline scenario. It should however be noted that a difference be-
tween baseline and activity emissions does not mean that an activity is additional, especially 
if the methodology used to calculate baseline emissions does not specifically assess an activ-
ity’s additionality. Here, we would like to stress that the term ‘baseline’ is generic and can 
relate to different but overlapping concepts. In the case of additionality testing, ‘baseline’ re-
fers to the reference scenario against which additionality is assessed (“what is already present 
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and available”) (Michaelowa et al. 2019). A ‘crediting baseline’ to determine an activity’s emis-
sion reductions or avoidance is not necessarily the same as a reference scenario. Another use 
of the term ‘baseline’ relates to emission projections at the national or sectoral level in the 
context of the NDC. 
Some stakeholders are of the opinion that additionality determination can be built into the 
baseline definition in contexts with ambitious emission caps, that is, caps that are set consid-
erably below business-as-usual (BAU). Depending on the selected baseline approach, such in-
tegration may be possible but needs a careful approach.  
Crediting baselines set the reference level of GHG emissions against which the maximum vol-
ume of carbon credits that can be issued is calculated (Lo Re et al. 2019). Historically, the 
crediting baseline was often equated to BAU, the continuation of historic emission levels. 
However, there are various other options for baseline setting, including the use of benchmarks 
or emission pathways aligned with policies/targets (see section 4.1). 
Baselines are ‘counterfactuals’ and no single ‘true’ approach to baseline setting exists (Lo Re 
et al. 2019; Michaelowa et al. 2021a). Additionality, too, is counterfactual by nature (Gillen-
water 2012).  
2.2. Climate policy context: Kyoto Protocol and Paris Agreement 
The KP of 1997 assigned binding emission caps to developed country Parties. These caps had 
identical characteristics: they quantified an upper limit for Parties’ cumulative economy-wide 
GHG emissions during the commitment periods (2008-2012 and 2013-2020). Developing 
country Parties were not required to limit their emissions, reflecting the principle of common 
but differentiated responsibilities (CBDR). Economies in transition were assigned emission 
caps that were significantly above their post-Soviet-era emission levels, providing space to 
increase emissions back to their Soviet-era levels. Such excess quota above BAU emissions is 
referred to as ‘hot air’.  
The KP allowed developed country Parties to meet their caps flexibly, including by buying and 
selling carbon credits issued under Joint Implementation (JI) and the CDM, for mitigation out-
comes generated in other Parties with and without emission caps, respectively. JI consisted of 
two tracks: Track 1 was supervised by host countries while Track 2 was supervised by an in-
ternational JI Supervisory Body (JISC). The operation of JI was linked to commitment periods, 
and thus, it effectively ended at the end of the first commitment period in 2012. The second 
commitment period did not enter into force until late 2020. The CDM, on the other hand, is 
operated by the international CDM Executive Board (EB), which provides methodological guid-
ance, approves methodologies, registers CDM activities and issues CDM credits. The future of 
the CDM and how its activities are to be “transitioned” to the PA regime is currently being 
negotiated. 
The PA of 2015 introduces mitigation targets – NDCs – of all country Parties. These are nation-
ally determined, and differ from each other in various respects. The PA (and related decisions) 
only provides limited guidance that promotes harmonisation of NDCs. A decision on ’features‘ 
of NDCs was postponed to 2024 and a decision on ‘common time frames’ is still being negoti-
ated, but Parties adopted a list of information that Parties must communicate to enhance 
clarity, transparency and understanding of NDCs (UNFCCC 2018). In addition, Parties must 
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submit information on their NDCs, methodologies and assumptions as well as indicators to 
track progress in their biennial transparency reports (decision 18/CMA.1). 
Mitigation targets included in NDCs can take a variety of different forms: 
Figure 1: Different forms of mitigation targets within NDCs 
 
Source: Authors 
Parties were expected to submit an updated or second NDC as well as a long-term low emis-
sion development strategy (LT-LEDS) before the implementation of the PA started in 2021. 
However, many NDC updates are still ongoing as of June 2021 and most countries have not 
yet communicated an LT-LEDS. 
Article 6 of the PA provides for voluntary international cooperation between Parties “in the 
implementation of their nationally determined contributions to allow for higher ambition in 
their mitigation and adaptation actions and to promote sustainable development and envi-
ronmental integrity”. Articles 6.2-6.7 cover market-based approaches while Articles 6.8-6.9 
cover non-market-based approaches. Under so-called Article 6.2 guidance, Parties can pursue 
(market-based) cooperative approaches that involve the international transfer of mitigation 
outcomes. When engaging in these cooperative approaches, they are required to report to 
the PA how they ensure environmental integrity, apply robust accounting, including to avoid 
double counting, and promote sustainable development. This information will be subject to a 
technical expert review. Under Article 6.4, a new international mechanism will be established 
for crediting mitigation outcomes. The so-called A6.4M will be supervised by an international 
Supervisory Body (SB) which will be responsible for approving rules and methodologies, in-
cluding for additionality and baseline setting, and issuing carbon credits (so-called Article 6.4 
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Emission Reductions, A6.4ERs). The transfers of A6.4ERs will be governed by the rules of the 
Article 6.2 guidance. 
As of June 2021, the rules for Article 6 were still under negotiation. They are due to be adopted 
at the UN climate conference in Glasgow (COP26) in November 2021. The latest Article 6 draft 
negotiation texts foresee a transition of existing CDM activities and methodologies to the 
A6.4M. The latter requires their revision in order to be aligned with the new rules on method-
ologies for Article 6.4 activities (Michaelowa et al. 2020a). Assuming the adoption of Article 6 
rules at COP26, the A6.4M could be operational (i.e., register activities and issue credits) in 
2023. Although the lack of agreed rules and an operational A6.4M hinders the development 
of Article 6 activities, some Article 6 pilots are already ongoing and provide valuable insights 
to additionality testing and baseline setting in the context of the PA. 
3. Additionality testing methodologies 
This chapter will first take a closer look at the evolution of additionality testing across the last 
decades before discussing revision needs in the context of the PA by building on the views 
shared in workshop discussions and in the conducted survey. 
3.1. Evolution of additionality testing 
Article 6 and 12 of the KP introduced the requirement of additionality to JI and CDM, respec-
tively, and the Marrakesh Accords (2001) provided initial guidance hereon. Under JI Track 1, 
the host country may verify mitigation outcomes as additional to any that would otherwise 
occur. Under JI Track 2, an accredited third party will determine additionality in line with JISC 
guidance. Under CDM, additionality is determined by an accredited third party in line with 
CDM EB guidance. Negotiators were not able to agree on an operational definition of addi-
tionality and left the development of additionality rules to the CDM EB and JISC (Michaelowa 
2009). 
Assuming that JI host countries have ambitious emission caps that are set below BAU, they 
have a strong interest in ensuring additionality since, if they issue non-additional JI credits, 
they would need to make up the difference and mitigate even more (Kollmuss et al. 2015). 
However, JI host countries with ‘hot air’ in their Kyoto targets lack this incentive. Thus, as long 
as there is a possibility of hot air in host country targets, international oversight would be 
needed for additionality testing (Michaelowa et al. 2019). In JI host countries, there were 
many interest groups that pushed for setting baselines in a manner that overstated emission 
reductions and governments had lacked the capacity to withstand such forces (Schmitz and 
Michaelowa 2005). 
The JISC’s guidance on additionality testing includes two approaches: a JI-specific approach or 
an approved CDM methodology approach. The JI-specific approach, in turn, includes three 
options: (1) demonstrating that the activity scenario is not part of a conservative baseline sce-
nario and that the activity will lead to mitigation outcomes; (2) demonstrating that compara-
ble JI activities (same GHG mitigation measure, same country, similar technology, similar 
scale) have already been deemed additional; and (3) applying the most recent version of the 
CDM ‘Tool for the demonstration and assessment of additionality’ or any other method for 
proving additionality approved by the CDM EB (see below). Option (3) is very close to the 
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approved CDM methodology approach, that is, application of an applicable CDM methodology 
to a JI activity. In all cases, the appropriateness of the selected approach must be convincingly 
substantiated to the accredited independent entities. 
Under the CDM, for small-scale projects, barrier testing was enshrined as the main addition-
ality testing method in 2003. For large-scale projects, the EB adopted in 2004 a consolidated 
methodological ‘tool for the demonstration and assessment of additionality’, comprising a 
choice of an investment or a barrier analysis, complemented by a common practice analysis 
(Michaelowa 2009). Since no widely-applicable additionality test had been submitted after-
wards, the consolidated additionality tool became the de facto standard for additionality test-
ing with the EB turning to the task to identify simplified methods (Michaelowa 2009).  
The latest version (v. 7) of this tool from 2012 includes the following steps for demonstrating 
and assessing additionality: 
Figure 2: Steps for demonstrating and assessing additionality 
 
Source: Authors’ adaptation of UNFCCC (2012b) 
Investment tests represent the ‘workhorse’ of the CDM additionality determination since 
2007. Investment analysis faced challenges regarding the availability and transparency of in-
formation on financial parameters for the calculation of the internal rate of return (IRR) lead-
ing to a risk of gaming the parameters which the CDM EB and validators have to discover.  
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Under the KP, several discussions took place regarding policy additionality. Policy additionality 
was introduced as a safeguard against artificially high baseline scenarios and to avoid potential 
perverse incentives of the CDM that weaken internal emission reduction policies within host 
countries (UNFCCC 2013). During the early stages of the CDM, the CDM EB agreed to use ‘E+ 
and E- policies’ rules as part of the baseline determination. E+ policies referred to “national 
and/or sectoral policies or regulations that give comparative advantages to more emissions-
intensive technologies or fuels over less emissions-intensive technologies or fuels” (UNFCCC 
2005). These policies could only be accounted in the baseline scenario if adopted prior to the 
KP. E- policies have been defined as “national and/or sectoral policies or regulations that give 
comparative advantages to less emissions-intensive technologies” (UNFCCC 2005). Such policy 
instruments introduced after 2001 were not to be taken into account in assessing additionality 
of CDM projects. The rationale behind not considering policy instruments anymore was to 
avoid the perverse incentive to not adopt climate policies in order to be able to generate more 
carbon credits (Shishlov and Bellassen 2012).  
In 2008, the first two methodologies defining automatic additionality were adopted(Michae-
lowa 2009). The CDM EB’s promotion of standardised approaches since 2011 has also resulted 
in the emergence of positive lists of technologies that are deemed automatically additional, 
e.g. due to their generally high costs. Positive lists are not a panacea as they can become ob-
solete quickly (Michaelowa et al. 2019), but they are increasingly applied also by standards 
catering to the voluntary carbon market. Provides an overview of the evolution of additional-
ity testing. 
Figure 3: Evolution of additionality testing 
 
Source: Authors 
3.2. Revision needs regarding additionality determination under the 
Paris Agreement 
A key question raised by experts in CMM-WG workshops was how to ensure consistency in 
additionality determination in cooperative approaches (Article 6.2) and under the A6.4M. 
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Multiple suggestions were made to streamline additionality tests as much as possible, making 
them clear and easy to implement. Some survey respondents questioned whether additional-
ity testing is still a concept that makes sense in the PA context, though the majority were in 
favour of the concept’s application. Looking beyond the survey, several workshop participants 
noted that roots and functions of additionality under the CDM would have to be specified 
before analysing how these must be adapted and transformed for the PA context. 
The current Article 6.2 draft negotiation texts do not go into detail on the additionality defini-
tion (UNFCC 2019d). The latest Article 6.4 draft negotiation texts still include several defini-
tions or specifications, including ‘being additional to what would occur in the absence of the 
mechanism’, ‘additional to what would otherwise occur, including per existing policies, laws 
and regulation’, being ‘complementary and/or additional to policies and measures associated 
with the NDC of the host Party’ (UNFCCC 2019a; UNFCCC 2019b; UNFCCC 2019c). The latter 
wording takes into account the dynamic nature of the PA which requires countries to increase 
their ambition every five years in the form of new or updated NDCs. Thus, the practice of not 
considering new national mitigation policies in the form of the KP E+/E- rule is seen as no 
longer appropriate. However, other safeguards will need to be taken to ensure that there are 
no perverse incentives provided by carbon markets to, for example, exclude certain sectors 
from the NDC’s scope or to not adopt certain policies to be able to continue generating credits 
from specific activities. 
Considering this context, there are some questions that still need to be resolved to operation-
alise the additionality definitions in the negotiation texts: 
Figure 4: Key questions faced by additionality determination under Article 6 
 
Source: Authors 
With regard to the first question, the results of the survey provide some interesting insights. 
When asked whether additionality testing should be contingent on the coverage of an activity 
by the NDC, 39.7% of the respondents strongly agreed that additionality testing is needed for 
activities that are not covered by the NDC. When asked whether additionality testing is re-
quired for activities covered by the NDC, 32.3% of the participants strongly agreed. Those who 
agreed were then asked to rate the importance of factors that should be taken into consider-
ation (such as financial barriers, existing policies, conditionality of targets, etc.). CMM-WG dis-
cussants noted that additionality testing for expected or planned policies poses many chal-
lenges as opposed to the less complex testing of existing policies. 
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With regard to the second question, a distinction between conditional and unconditional tar-
gets would probably need to be made (Michaelowa et al. 2020b). However, there is currently 
no common understanding of (un)conditionality of NDC targets, and developing countries use 
different definitions in their NDCs. Therefore, attention needs to be paid to how the host 
country defines the conditionality of its targets and what role it foresees for Article 6 cooper-
ation. From a host country perspective, it is in their interest that the crediting activity goes 
beyond the unconditional target if the target is below BAU, as there might otherwise be a high 
risk of overselling mitigation outcomes.  
With regard to the third question, some CMM-WG participants called into question whether 
to integrate long-term net-zero targets into additionality determination. 
In the subsequent section, we develop an integrated approach of three ‘shades’ of addition-
ality addressing the three key questions. 
3.2.1. A conceptual distinction of three ‘shades’ of additionality 
In the negotiations and discussions to operationalise additionality for the Article 6 context, 
three ‘shades’ of the concept can be distinguished.  
Source: Authors 
These three ‘shades’ of additionality can be applied to project or programmatic but also up-
scaled approaches including sectoral and policy approaches. Especially with the latter, many 
difficulties are associated with the development of a generally accepted approach to addition-
ality testing, as shown by the work of the Transformative Carbon Asset Facility (TCAF) over 
Figure 5: The three ‘shades’ of additionality testing under Article 6  
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several years, which is not yet conclusive. In general, two approaches to additionality testing 
for policy approaches are currently being discussed: Economic modelling (TCAF, Climate 
Teams) or qualitative approaches which rely on the estimation and projection of GHG emis-
sion developments for a large number of impacts (Wooders et al. 2016). Michaelowa et al. 
(2019) propose default financial parameters to operationalise the latter approach, see below. 
Financial additionality 
One expert emphasised in the CMM-WG discussion that the laundering of hot air should be 
prevented through additionality testing. In case the NDC is not ambitious, the existing CDM 
investment test should be used. Investment tests aim to prove ‘financial additionality’ by 
showing that the proposed activity is less economically attractive than realistic alternative in-
vestment options. Activity proponents need to identify the most suitable analysis method: 
simple cost analysis, an investment comparison analysis or a benchmark analysis. If the credit 
sale is the only source of revenue for the project (e.g., destruction of industrial gases), a simple 
cost analysis showing that the project generates additional costs is sufficient. Alternatively, if 
an activity can generate revenues or savings beyond the sale of credits (e.g., generation of 
electricity from renewable energy), an investment comparison or a benchmark analysis is re-
quired (Shishlov and Bellassen 2012). These approaches have been widely applied under the 
CDM with regulators specifying standardised levels of parameters, e.g., an IRR benchmark dif-
ferentiated by country. While some CMM-WG discussants stressed the potential for gaming 
with investment testing as a lesson learned from the CDM, others stated that growing experi-
ence of auditors and regulators has reduced gaming over time. 
At the sectoral level, commercially viable investments in (best available, or common practice) 
technologies must be considered in the sectoral emission reference scenario for the crediting 
period if additionality is not tested for each activity.  
The test for regulatory policy instruments proposed by Michaelowa et al. (2019) (applying a 
payback period threshold for users of mandated technologies) is derived from the investment 
test approach.  
Regulatory additionality 
Parties to the PA will implement policies and measures that mobilise mitigation to achieve 
their NDC commitments. When authorising transfers, host Parties must be certain that they 
are not transferring mitigation that is anyway mandated by law in their country. The concept 
of regulatory additionality has been applied by domestic carbon market standards, in particu-
lar for generating offsets for subnational emissions trading schemes in the US.  
Special considerations should be paid to cases where the implementation of the regulation is 
doubtful. For example, if a government has a specific regulation but does not have the power 
to enforce it, the activity may still be considered additional from the regulatory test point of 
view. Here, enforcement test thresholds regarding the level of enforcement actually achieved 
can be applied.  
In CMM-WG discussions, there was a general consensus that policies and regulations must be 
considered in additionality determination. A key aspect raised in this regard was the difference 
between theory and practice as the introduction and impact of new policies is not always 
straightforward, and policy implementation may take more time than envisaged. Given that 
situation, the question is whether regulatory additionality must be tested frequently ex-post. 
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At the level of project or programmatic activities, there could be a check whether the activity 
(e.g., use of a specific technology) will be mandated by policies in the short-term future (i.e., 
during the initial crediting period). This “regulatory” additionality requires a complete and 
consistent mapping of policies with clear direct financial or regulatory impact on the activity. 
If a policy is not considered to have an impact or the policy is not enforced, this must be ro-
bustly explained and documented. 
For sector-level crediting, robustly estimated impacts of different policies on the observed 
emission levels must be calculated into the sectoral emission reference scenario against which 
additionality is determined. 
The proposals by Michaelowa et al. (2019) that i) carbon pricing instruments should only be 
allowed to generate credits if they exceed a pre-determined threshold (e.g. 5 EUR/t CO2 for 
developing countries) and ii) that cap and trade schemes should only be deemed additional in 
the absence of over-allocation of allowances also belong to the category of regulatory addi-
tionality. 
Target additionality 
Even if all countries have ambitious targets and there is no double counting, there will still be 
a need to see whether sectoral caps/strategies are stringent, so that the buyer does not di-
minish domestic ambition.  
In the case of sectoral approaches, the emissions reference scenario against which addition-
ality is determined thus must either be below or at the level of sectoral emissions pathways 
in line with the multi-year or single-year NDC target (target referring to the end of the NDC 
implementation period), provided it does not include ‘hot air’. The countries’ differentiation 
between unconditional and conditional targets will need to be taken into account at the sector 
level. 
For projects and programmatic approaches, the determination of target additionality is more 
complex as the specific type of quantitative and qualitative unconditional targets, underlying 
assumptions, projections and plans of the host country need to be taken into account. In case 
the NDC targets have been developed in a bottom-up manner, the host country has most likely 
taken into account the GHG emissions impact of ongoing and planned activities/policies and 
derived the respective NDC target accordingly. If the proposed crediting project does not form 
part of the measures foreseen to reach a certain NDC target, is not tackled by policies required 
for NDC implementation or is not commercially viable, then the project can be considered 
additional. When developed in a top-down manner, implying that no specific measures are 
associated with the NDC target, NDC additionality gets even more difficult to prove. One way 
would be to allocate certain emission reduction responsibilities to reach a sectoral NDC target 
to installations or actors in a sub-sector. Alternatively, a benchmark can be introduced that 
complies with the level of ambition required for reaching the unconditional target.  
Proving target additionality against LT-LEDS is particularly challenging because LT-LEDS take a 
variety of different forms and are unlikely to become more comparable in the near term. For 
example, many LT-LEDS refer to different types of neutrality such as carbon, GHG or CO2 neu-
trality, and there is no common understanding of those terms. In addition, a remaining ques-
tion in this context is whether market-based cooperation is a way for a host country to reach 
an LT-LEDS goal.  
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3.2.2. Distinguishing between additionality and vulnerability of activities 
Over the last years, a concept related to but not identical to additionality has emerged in dis-
cussions on crediting mechanisms. The concept of ‘vulnerability’ relates to ongoing projects 
at risk of being discontinued in case they do not receive any revenues from emission credit 
sales. The emergence of this definition is linked to the acrimonious debate on whether activi-
ties registered under the CDM should be allowed to transition to the new carbon markets 
under the PA. A methodology for assessment of vulnerability has been developed by the Oeko 
Institute and New Climate Institute (see Warnecke et al. 2017). 
The idea of vulnerability explains why Gold Standard asks projects at the time of renewal of 
their crediting period to demonstrate ‘ongoing financial needs’ (OFN) to ensure carbon fi-
nance is directed to where it is most needed. OFN is a qualitative assessment that aims to 
demonstrate that the finance coming from the sale of credits is material to the ongoing sus-
tainability of the project (Gold Standard 2021). Gold Standard requires proof of OFN as a cri-
terion for re-registration of activities from other standards to the Gold Standard, if their cred-
iting period predates January 2016. 
The OFN assessment should be differentiated from a re-assessment of additionality as it does 
not take into account new regulations. We would like to stress that there is no link between 
the additionality of a project and its vulnerability. Since additionality is tested ex-ante, at the 
point of the investment decision, additionality is different from ‘vulnerability’ which is only 
assessed ex-post. An activity that has been truly additional at the time of its investment deci-
sion should not be ‘deprived’ of revenues from carbon credit sales. What is clear is that activ-
ities featuring OFN are more likely to have been additional at the time of investment than 
activities not featuring OFN. 
3.2.3. The role of positive lists under the PA 
Under the PA, positive lists could be developed at the national level to satisfy the three ‘shades 
of additionality’ in the national context. Alignment with investment barriers and mitigation 
costs, existing regulation and policies as well as NDCs and LT-LEDS would need to be taken 
into consideration for that. To avoid positive lists becoming obsolete, lists would need to be 
updated frequently.  
Four out of five survey respondents agreed that positive lists can be a valuable tool for addi-
tionality testing. When asked who should develop and approve positive lists, 42.9% of re-
spondents agreed that host countries should develop their own positive lists, which would 
then be approved by international bodies. Another 33.3% believed that an international body 
should be solely responsible. Only 9.5% agreed that the host country should develop the list 
on its own.  
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Figure 6: Expressed approval preferences for positive lists  
 
Source: Authors 
Regarding the regular updating of positive lists, opinions were very diverse: Approximately a 
quarter selected every three years, another quarter favouring every five years and other sig-
nificant percentages chose to update in line with NDC implementation periods or on a case-
by-case basis. All participants felt that updating every 10 years would be too infrequent, how-
ever. Several of the participants that selected ‘other’ felt that updates should be aligned with 
advancement in technology or other benchmarks. 
4. Baseline setting methodologies  
This chapter defines approaches to baseline setting, then looks at the evolution of baseline 
setting approaches under the KP and finally turns to the discussion of baseline setting meth-
odologies in the PA context, summarising views and issues raised by workshop and survey 
participants.  
4.1. Principal approaches to crediting baselines 
In general, there are various options for setting a crediting baseline, inter alia, through: 
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Figure 7: Options for crediting baseline setting 
 
Source: Authors 
We now discuss how baseline approaches have developed over time. 
4.2. Evolution of baseline setting approaches under the Kyoto Protocol 
Under JI and CDM, a multitude of baseline setting approaches have been applied. In the Mar-
rakech Accords, similar but not identical guidance on baseline setting was provided for both 
JI and CDM. For JI, the Accords specified that a baseline shall be set on a project-specific basis 
and/or use a multi-project emission factor, take into account relevant national and/or sectoral 
policies and use conservative assumptions (UNFCCC 2002). Under JI, the JISC developed ‘Guid-
ance on criteria for baseline setting and monitoring’ in 2006. For baseline setting, the JISC 
provides three options: (1) a JI-specific approach based on guidance provided in the Marra-
kech Accords; (2) a methodology for baseline setting approved by the CDM EB; or (3) an ap-
proach for baseline setting already taken in comparable JI projects. For the revision of the JI 
guidelines, it was proposed that the host Party can develop standardised baselines based on 
criteria which are set and periodically updated by the JISC and that the host country can decide 
on a lower transaction volume of JI credits (UNFCCC 2016b, Annex I).  
For the CDM, the Marrakech Accords defined three generic baseline methodology approaches 
(UNFCCC 2002):  
a. existing actual or historical emissions 
b. emissions from a technology that represents an economically attractive course of ac-
tion, taking into account barriers to investment 
c. average emissions of similar project activities undertaken in the previous five years, in 
similar social, economic, environmental and technological circumstances, and whose 
performance is among the top 20 percent of their category 
Under the CDM, baselines can be established by project participants, in a conservative manner 
and by taking into account relevant national and/or sectoral policies with the option of sim-
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plified procedures for small-scale CDM projects (UNFCCC 2002).  As the CDM matured, sepa-
rate baseline tools applicable to different baseline methodologies were developed by the UN-
FCCC Secretariat. In addition, a generic ‘combined tool to identify the baseline scenario and 
demonstrate additionality’ was developed in 2006.  
Many baseline setting approaches rely on a bottom-up estimation of parameters (e.g., emis-
sion factor of current technology used). This implies that the monitoring of such parameters 
is time-consuming and entails high transaction costs for control groups (e.g., AM 0046 for ef-
ficient lighting). Baseline methodologies and key parameters need to be regularly updated to 
reflect technological changes to ensure environmental integrity (Michaelowa et al. 2019). One 
option to lower the transaction costs is to move towards the use of top-down parameters such 
as conservative defaults for key parameters. From 2011 onwards, the CDM EB started with 
the development of standardised baselines building on conservative default factors for key 
parameters or emission-rate thresholds or benchmarks either through the staff of the UNFCCC 
Secretariat for global applicability under specific eligibility criteria or through host countries 
and their consultants (see UNFCCC 2012). 
4.3. Revision needs to baseline setting approaches in the PA context 
In the context of the PA, several key questions for baseline setting arise as outlined in Figure 
8. 
Figure 8: Key questions faced by baseline setting under Article 6 
 
Source: Authors 
4.3.1. Appropriate baseline setting approaches for different activity types 
In the context of the PA, where Parties are urged to increase their ambitions every 5 years, 
the use of BAU as (crediting) baseline is not target-oriented. Therefore, the latest Article 6.2 
draft negotiation texts establish ‘below BAU’ as a minimum criterion, with many more ambi-
tious approaches to baseline setting currently being discussed under the A6.4M. The draft 
RMPs include different baseline setting options comprising a BAT approach, a benchmark or 
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a performance-based approach (note that these options are seen as distinct while in our def-
inition they are different outcomes of a performance benchmark). In case these three ap-
proaches are not considered economically and technologically viable, baselines can also be 
based on projected emissions (akin to known BAU baselines) or historical emissions (UNFCCC 
2019a; UNFCCC 2019b). Therefore, the current negotiation texts essentially assemble all pos-
sible baseline approaches. 
The listed approaches to baseline setting have different advantages and disadvantages. Base-
lines based on projections have in common that they involve a number of assumptions on 
future developments which can result in growing uncertainties the longer the baseline validity 
period becomes. Whereas emission pathways defined in IPCC Assessment Reports build on 
extensive modelling exercises which can be broken down to sectoral pathways, country-spe-
cific BAU scenarios are confronted with a large number of assumptions made regarding the 
reference level and could potentially not be sufficiently ambitious. Performance-benchmark 
approaches set baselines at a desired level of performance which can be less stringent (e.g., 
average performances) or more stringent (e.g., high percentiles or BAT). BAT approaches have 
been criticised for being excessively stringent, but the level of aggregation (sub-national, na-
tional, regional, global) is decisive. Benchmark approaches are in general technology-focused 
and can thus better reflect technological development. However, the development of bench-
marks requires access to the relevant data and they are only suitable for homogenous sectors, 
mostly industry, and should not be applied in complex and heterogenous sectors (Schneider 
et al. 2012). 
When asked to rate baseline setting approaches regarding their appropriateness, the views of 
survey participants were very skewed, with all choices (historical emissions, (below) BAU, pro-
jected emissions associated with (un)conditional NDC, benchmarks, BAT) receiving an average 
score of 2 out of 4 (“appropriate under specific circumstances”). The highest scoring choices 
were projected emissions associated with the unconditional NDC and benchmarks derived 
from BAT, both with scores of 2.82 out of 4. On the question whether baseline setting should 
contribute to ambition raising, a large proportion (32.3%) felt neutrally, though the majority 
still agreed. In addition, most respondents agreed with the need to establish a default ap-
proach to setting crediting baselines in the context of the PA. Overall, there was a consensus 
that one-size-fits-all approaches should be avoided, but clear guidance could be given. Re-
spondents agreed that their answers were dependent on what this “default approach” would 
look like. Some workshop participants also cautioned against benchmarking as this has only 
worked in specific cases. Often, there were different understandings of benchmarks in carbon 
markets. Several participants noted the limited access to data from the industry to establish 
robust benchmarks. In the case of national benchmarks, one would run into questions of how 
to consider technology transfer and climate finance impacts. 
4.3.2. Upscaling baselines 
As a rule of thumb, it can be noted that baseline setting gets more complex with increasing 
scale/scope of the activity, as a higher number of influencing factors needs to be considered 
(Wooders et al. 2016). At the activity-level, baselines are set in accordance with GHG emission 
projections without the activity’s impact or a technology-specific benchmark is derived from 
industry data. At the sectoral level, it is more challenging to estimate and project GHG emis-
sion developments due to the larger number of actors and more indirect impacts. Key in this 
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case is the aggregation level in terms of which processes are exactly focused upon. The choice 
of the “boundary” or “level of aggregation” can bring some gaming risks and must be robustly 
justified.  
Regarding baseline setting for policy approaches, experts suggest a need to first determine 
the boundaries of the baseline scenario including the most relevant drivers that will presum-
ably affect emissions pathways in the absence of the respective policy (Kreibich and Obergas-
sel 2018). There are two ways in which such emissions pathways can be identified, either 
through the application of external projections for main drivers of emissions or through a bot-
tom-up analysis of sub-sectoral emissions drivers and trends which are matched against na-
tion-wide emission projections (Ahonen et al. 2020).  
4.3.3. Linking the baseline to the long-term target of the PA – from short- to long-term 
Under the KP, baselines usually reflected on what is. However, in the context of the PA’s am-
bition cycle, the question of what should be is moving into the foreground. This would imply 
a shift from BAU projections, historical emissions and average performance benchmark-based 
baselines to high percentile or BAT-technology-determined benchmarks and projections in 
line with PA long-term-target-compatible pathways. We now discuss the consequences of 
such PA alignment approaches starting with short-term, static aspects and ending with long-
term, dynamic considerations. 
4.3.3.1. Inclusion of existing and planned policies in static baselines 
An unresolved question in Article 6.4 negotiations on baseline setting is the role of existing 
and planned policies. The first and second iteration of the draft text outline that each meth-
odology needs to take into account relevant policies, if appropriate (UNFCCC 2019a, para. 37; 
UNFCCC 2019b, para. 37). In addition, the second iteration specifies that the methodology 
needs to be consistent with the NDC of the host Party (UNFCCC 2019b, para. 37). The NDC lays 
out the planned policies and measures of the host Party. 
The negotiation texts thus leave ample room for discussion on the definition of a ‘relevant 
policy’. For example, whether this includes only existing or also planned policies as well as 
activities. In this regard, the extent to which enforcement is considered, especially in the con-
text of NDCs, is decisive. In general, whether methodologies should also consider planned pol-
icies has important implications for sectoral and policy crediting. 
An issue that survey respondents largely agreed on was the consideration of existing policies 
in baseline setting. 50% ‘strongly agreed’ that existing policies should be taken into account, 
while 37.9% ‘agreed’. Only three, i.e., 4% of participants disagreed with the statement. There 
was slightly less consensus on the issue of planned policies. More than half of respondents 
agreed or strongly agreed that planned policies should be considered, but the group was less 
convinced on this topic than consideration of existing policies. The disagreement primarily 
stemmed from the uncertainty of whether or not planned policies would actually be imple-
mented in the short term. For this reason, some participants felt that only existing policies 
should be considered. In the words of one participant, “planned policies are as good as non-
existent”. Even those who agreed that planned policies should be considered often included 
comments suggesting that the likelihood of such policies being enacted needs be taken into 
account. 
Additionality determination and baseline setting methodologies 
CMM-WG 
18 
During the second workshop, the relationship between policy gaps and crediting potential was 
discussed. It was noted that the greater the policy coverage and/or ambition, the smaller the 
crediting potential and the fewer the niches for the crediting of policy gaps. It was suggested 
that the implementation of climate policies consistent with the long-term goals of the PA 
would ultimately make international crediting obsolete. It was also suggested that Article 6 
was likely to have low potential in EU Member States with comprehensive climate policies. 
4.3.3.2. Consideration of NDCs in static baseline setting 
From a theoretical perspective, it will be in the host country’s own interest to set the crediting 
baseline in line with the unconditional NDC to prevent any over-crediting. In practice, how-
ever, the (un)conditionality of NDC targets has never been clearly defined and the understand-
ing of what the concept entails diverges significantly, also in its implementation. However, 
such a distinction will be pivotal for buyer countries and entities, so that they can be sure to 
not undermine environmental integrity by promoting activities which could have been imple-
mented unilaterally. Furthermore, NDCs may contain ‘hot air’, thus undermining the host 
country’s incentive to avoid over-crediting. 
Over 70% of survey respondents agreed that baseline setting should include the consideration 
of unconditional NDC targets, and 61.8% favoured consideration of conditional NDC targets, 
as well. In workshop discussions, it was suggested that the level of stringency of crediting 
baselines depends on the extent of the activity’s planned contribution to NDC implementa-
tion. In some cases, this could be easy to determine (e.g., in case of sectoral crediting against 
a sectoral NDC target), while in other cases, the NDC targets may not readily inform a specific 
activity’s role in its implementation. If the activity’s contribution is not needed for NDC imple-
mentation, stringent baselines would not be needed.  
4.3.3.3. Making baselines dynamic  
Carbon market actors are increasingly considering the use of dynamic baselines that are 
aligned with PA’s ambition cycle despite no mentioning of such an approach in the current 
Article 6 draft negotiation texts. There are two ways of rendering baselines more dynamic: 
1) One option would be to use baselines that build on key parameters which are esti-
mated ex-ante, but credits are only issued for ex-post calculations of these parameters 
based on collected and validated data (Michaelowa and Butzengeiger 2017; Michae-
lowa et al. 2019). As a consequence, dynamic baselines adjust automatically to chang-
ing GHG emissions trajectories and reflect what has happened and not solely projec-
tions. 
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2) Another option is to design baselines in a manner such that the baseline emissions 
intensity decreases over time through the application of a dynamic transition param-
eter (Hermwille 2020) or ambition coefficient (Michaelowa et al. 2021b). The baseline 
emission intensity would gradually move downwards from a BAU trajectory (IS-mar-
gin) towards a normative/policy reference (OUGHT margin) which can be set at differ-
ent levels including at BAT, the national or sectoral NDC or long-term decarbonisation 
pathway or in line with a net-zero pathway.  
   Source: Hermwille 2020 
The approaches have in common that they prevent the overselling of mitigation outcomes 
and contribute to the achievement of Parties’ NDCs. However, some project developers fear 
that the first approach to dynamic baselines could contribute to increased unpredictability, 
thus undermining carbon market incentives. Option two therefore offers a heuristic solution 
in this regard, striking a balance between predictability and stringency by combining ex-ante 
fixed declines of baseline parameters and updates of all baseline parameters when the cred-
iting period is renewed. This will provide more certainty for project owners and investors. 
Another heuristic solution would be to apply relatively short crediting periods, so that the 
baseline would need to be updated rather sooner than later. However, this might be appro-
priate only for some technologies as the crediting period should be in line with the payback 
period of a technology to give an investment incentive.  
In line with the preceding discussion, one workshop participant stressed that project develop-
ers do not like moving targets and that it would be helpful if the baseline and attribution ap-
proach remains fixed from the beginning. Some experts favoured a baseline-setting approach 
where baselines are more regularly updated rather than fixed ex-ante and potentially for a 
long period of time. In general, the private sector activity developer will more likely favour the 
second approach to dynamic baseline setting, whereas a governmental actor might favour the 
first, as it ensures that generated mitigation outcomes are real. 
4.3.3.4. Considering LT-LEDS in baseline setting 
Besides the NDC and related policy documents, baseline setting approaches could also con-
sider countries’ LT-LEDS and related roadmaps and action plans. LT-LEDS are supposed to pro-
vide the long-term vision of the transformation required to meet the PA’s long-term goal. Ide-
ally, NDCs and LT-LEDS are aligned. In this case, the crediting baseline could be set in line with 
the NDC/LT-LEDS trajectory without the risk of undermining incentives for the host country to 
Figure 9: Transitioning to a normative reference/OUGHT margin 
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undertake unilateral action (Michaelowa et al. 2021a). However, there are no agreed modali-
ties on developing LT-LEDS and the NDC/LT-LEDS emissions trajectory is often not aligned with 
the PA long-term goals and could potentially even include ‘hot air’. This implies that crediting 
baselines might need to be set at a level that is more stringent than the NDC/LT-LEDS pathway 
(Michaelowa et al. 2021a). Against this background, it is important to discuss how leading 
experts in this field see LT-LEDS informing the setting of crediting baselines. LT-LEDS could for 
example be translated into sector-level roadmaps and action plans as part of the baseline set-
ting process. 
63.2% of survey respondents agreed that long-term targets and strategies should be consid-
ered, with a small fraction disagreeing. Some respondents felt neutrally, noting that final out-
comes of LT-LEDS are uncertain. Overall, many respondents pointed out that long-term strat-
egies are dependent on finance, international partnerships, and other variables, and require 
individual assessment. Consideration of individual circumstances was a common theme 
throughout responses to many questions. 
4.3.3.5. Alignment of baseline setting with PA-compatible pathways 
A particular approach to render baselines more dynamic with a long-term perspective is the 
alignment with the 1.5 °C emissions pathway at the country level. Michaelowa et al. (2021b) 
propose the use of a so-called ‘ambition coefficient’ which is applied to the BAU scenario (cal-
culated according to CDM baseline methodology), so that it is gradually decreased and 
reaches over time a ‘normative reference’. This ‘normative reference’ level is then in line with 
the PA’s long-term goal of reaching net zero around mid-century and sustaining net zero in 
the second half of the century.  
Michaelowa et al. (2021b) set the normative reference at net zero. The derivation of the “am-
bition coefficient” is done according to net zero emissions pathways at the national level. The 
ambition coefficient applicable during a certain crediting period should be determined ex-ante 
to ensure investment certainty, ideally in line with NDC updates and the global stocktake. In a 
CMM-WG workshop, Axel Michaelowa applied the concept to a case study on grid connected 
electricity. First, the grid emissions factor is determined as per CDM tool 07, followed by the 
identification of the year in which net-zero is to be reached. In the case of Rwanda, the target 
year for reaching net-zero could for example be 2070. In a second step, the country-specific 
ambition coefficient is applied for each emission reduction vintage year (see Figure 10). 
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Figure 10: Application of the ambition coefficient to BAU  
 
Source: Authors 
In the survey, a majority of respondents also favoured including consideration of 1.5° C com-
patible pathways, though some answers did point out that this may not be an achievable goal 
for many countries. In workshop discussions, various participants emphasised that such align-
ment would require heavy lifting to get it to the negotiations and to get sufficient support for 
it. It was also mentioned that the baseline should not be extrapolated for 30 years. The regular 
updating of baselines over time was set against the application of an ambition coefficient. 
Participants further discussed whether the ambition coefficient would deliver on an ‘overall 
mitigation in global emissions’, understanding that conservative baselines are one of the op-
tions in negotiations to operationalise this principle. However, several participants argued 
that if ‘overall mitigation in global emissions’ is understood to be mitigation not to be claimed 
by the host country or buyer, the ambition coefficient cannot replace the approach of cancel-
ling a share of mitigation outcomes generated. It was also noted that the concept would tick 
two boxes as negotiators who are attached to CDM baseline approaches would be pleased as 
well as benchmark promoters since the concept has a link to net zero targets. 
5. Oversight and host country role 
5.1. Oversight and host country role under the Kyoto Protocol 
In general, two levels of oversight exist that play a role in baseline-and-credit mechanisms: 
international and host country oversight. In the context of the KP, the CDM has been subject 
to international oversight by the CDM EB. The role of the CDM host country was limited to 
approving projects and authorising project participants. However, some CDM host countries 
took an active role in the project approval process, requiring e.g., proof of specific sustainable 
development co-benefits (e.g., Malaysia, South Africa, Uruguay), requiring a minimum credit 
sales price (e.g., China) or levying a tax on CER issuances (e.g., China, Vietnam). Track 2 JI mir-
rors the CDM experience, with the JISC taking the role of the oversight body.  
The first JI track built on host country oversight, meaning that the host countries could largely 
introduce their own rules regarding project approval and credit issuance. In case of JI host 
countries with ambitious caps, host country oversight was deemed to ensure environmental 
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integrity. The challenge in this case was that JI host countries with ‘hot air’ did not have an 
incentive in ensuring additionality and robust baselines1. The review of the JI guidelines in May 
2016 aimed to address this issue by proposing draft modalities and procedures for a single-
track JI with a balanced oversight involving both the host country and international level. How-
ever, the revision which aimed at combining international and host Party oversight was never 
adopted. 
5.2. Oversight and host country role under the Paris Agreement 
The experiences under JI (both tracks) are particularly relevant for Article 6.2 cooperative ap-
proaches. Host country oversight in cooperative approaches could take the same form as un-
der the first or the second track or the merged version with some international oversight. In 
the end, it will be up to the cooperating Parties which cooperation model they agree upon. 
However, international oversight will also play a role in Article 6.2. Oversight in the A6.4M, on 
the contrary, will take similar forms as under the CDM. 
International oversight on Article 6 methodologies will differ between cooperative ap-
proaches and the Article 6.4 mechanism: 
➢ Article 6.2: Parties cooperating under Article 6.2 are subject to extensive reporting 
requirements on how the approach’s environmental integrity is ensured, including an 
initial report at the point of authorising the first ITMO transfer, an annual information 
comprising accounting information and a regular report which will be included in coun-
tries’ biennial transparency reports (BTRs). An Article 6 technical expert review (TER) 
assesses the reports that have been submitted by the participating Parties and flags 
concerns as well as makes recommendations to improve consistency with the guid-
ance (UNFCCC 2019d). Next to the Article 6 TER, there also exists a TER under the en-
hanced transparency framework of the PA, comprising BTRs and GHG inventories. The 
results of the Article 6 TER are considered in the general TER which compiles a UNFCCC 
synthesis report allowing for some scrutiny from the international community. In case 
of systematic issues, these could for example be forwarded to the Article 15 Compli-
ance Committee. The TER process is thus of central relevance for international over-
sight and a precondition for ‘pressure’ on states to ensure compliance. 
➢ Reporting formats and content as well as the review guidelines will play an im-
portant role in determining the degree of oversight in Article 6.2 cooperative ap-
proaches. In addition, mitigation leading to ITMOs will need to be verified, so an 
auditing process will take place which is carried out an independent third party 
which also adds some scrutiny. 
➢ Regarding international oversight in methodologies, the most challenging aspect 
will be establishing the link to NDC targets as these are nationally determined and 
their stringency cannot be assessed by international bodies or experts. Therefore, 
clear guardrails are required that ensure the application of conservative parame-
ters. 
 
1 For example, Russia and Ukraine sold several hundred million JI credits in a short period spanning late 2012 and 
early 2013 with spurious project documentation. 
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➢ Article 6.4: Under the A6.4M, there is international oversight in place through the SB 
which approves baseline and monitoring methodologies and adopts the rules for the 
mechanism’s operation. Another form of international oversight is the independent 
assessment of the activity against the requirements set out in the RMPs by a desig-
nated operational entity (DOE). Once the DOE confirms the positive outcome of the 
validation, it needs to submit a request for the activity’s registration to the DOE. 
Party-level oversight on Article 6 methodologies can take the following two forms: 
➢ Article 6.2: In a cooperative approach, oversight is performed by both the host and 
acquiring Party. Both Parties agree on a specific methodological approach. They are 
relatively free in their decision as long as the methodological approach complies with 
minimum standards set in the Article 6.2 guidance such as stringent reference levels, 
baselines set in a conservative manner or below BAU emission projections (including 
by taking into account all existing policies and addressing potential leakage) and mini-
mising the risk of non-permanence of mitigation and addressing reversals, if they oc-
cur. The authorisation of an activity is key as it triggers the applicability of the Article 
6.2 guidance. There is also some party-level oversight in preparing the reports on en-
vironmental integrity and accounting in the context of NDC implementation. As ITMOs 
shall be “verified” per the Article 6.2 guidance, there will likely be a role for (independ-
ent) third Party auditors, chosen by the participating Parties. 
➢ Article 6.4: The RMPs differentiate between the approval of activities and the author-
isation of ITMO transfers. In both cases, the host country has the oversight and can 
potentially implement domestic standards that need to be met. 
Figure 11: International oversight and party-level oversight under Article 6 
Source: Authors 
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5.2.1. Additionality testing through host countries 
The (approval and) authorisation process (of actors and activities to generate ITMOs) is where 
host countries’ considerations materialise. 
The current draft RMPs for Article 6.4 differentiate between an approval and authorisation 
process. Prior to a request for registration, the host Party shall provide the SB the approval of 
the activity. This approval comprises the following elements: Confirmation and information 
on how the activity fosters sustainable development in the host Party; approval of a potential 
renewal; an explanation of how the activity relates to and how the expected mitigation out-
comes contribute to the host Party’s NDC. In addition to the approval, the authorisation of 
public and private entities to participate in the activity shall be provided to the SB. Once the 
activity has issued mitigation outcomes, the host Party needs to authorise the transfer of 
ITMOs for use towards NDCs or for other international mitigation purposes (UNFCCC 2019a; 
UNFCCC 2019b; UNFCCC 2019c). 
This implies that the host country can use the authorisation process of activities to check how 
the foreseen additionality testing approach would for example comply with its NDC. Besides, 
the host Party may specify to the SB what baseline approaches and methodological require-
ments it intends to apply for A6.4 activities. These requirements need to be in line with the 
RMPs but could for example mandate the most stringent approach. This gives the host Party 
control over the kind of activities it wants to see promoted. In this manner, the host country 
can for example ensure that A6.4M-approved additionality tools are applied and that the rel-
evant host-country specific parameters are applied. The authorisation process can then take 
the form of a control of whether the activity developers comply with international rules but 
also national requirements. Under the A6.4M, it is also foreseen that a stakeholder consulta-
tion process is carried out as part of the authorisation process. This enables the participation 
of different interest groups in the decision-making process. 
For Article 6.2 cooperative approaches, the draft guidance only foresees an authorisation pro-
cess. However, the approaches build on bilaterally/multilaterally agreed methodologies, 
meaning that the host Party should have a say in the applied additionality tool. An example of 
how this could work in practice is the Joint Crediting Mechanism (JCM) where host countries 
and Japan set up ‘Joint Committees’ to approve baseline methodologies and agree on credit 
transfers. Therefore, host Parties should develop their own understanding of additionality for 
their particular host country context. Here, they could exploit the synergies with NDC devel-
opment: 
➢ Financial additionality could for example be linked to the development of marginal 
abatement cost curves for specific mitigation options which are used in the NDC de-
velopment process to identify the most efficient mitigation options. 
➢ Regulatory additionality will consider existing policies as per Article 6.2 guidance and 
host countries may identify the relevant policies based on their NDC implementation 
strategy. 
➢ Target additionality would benefit from clear links to targets, also regarding their 
(un)conditionality. Host Parties can also align guidance with information from their 
NDC, background documents used to determine NDC targets and public or non-public 
NDC implementation strategy documents. 
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In order to exploit such synergies between NDC development and Article 6 readiness, frequent 
coordination with NDC lead actors (lead ministry, Climate Change Committee) is required as 
well as good inter-ministerial coordination and stakeholder engagement processes. 
In general, there are two ways a host country can go about ensuring that its understanding of 
additionality is streamlined in approval and authorisation processes under Article 6: a case-
by-case assessment or standardisation. Standardisation can take the form of positive lists de-
veloped at the national level to satisfy host country needs (see below). 
A key question to consider is whether actions under the unconditional NDC targets automati-
cally become non-additional. In CMM-WG workshop discussions, it was cautioned that NDC 
targets are probably not the optimal point to anchor additionality determination. Even if it 
works in one host country context, it does not necessarily work in another, due to the unoffi-
cial nature of what conditional/unconditional means. Many NDCs do not specify what is in-
cluded in “unconditional” and what in “conditional” targets, nor a prioritisation of activities 
dependent on the amounts of finance received. Therefore, there is no objective way of decid-
ing what project activity corresponds to which mitigation trajectory. 
Clarity regarding unconditional and conditional targets would need to come from Parties’ own 
efforts. NDC commitments need to be itemised towards clear mitigation activities. Also, more 
transparency needs to be provided regarding possible finance sources for the different NDC 
targets (for example if unconditional targets depend solely on domestic funding or not). In the 
end, it would be up to the Party to clearly define whether conditional NDC targets can be 
achieved by Article 6 cooperation and still be deemed achieved despite corresponding adjust-
ments to the NDC emissions balance. So, it is in the host Parties’ prerogative to determine 
what needs to be considered when determining ’target additionality’ next to financial and 
regulatory additionality, which would be required anyway. 
One expert noted that many NDCs do not specify the proportion of climate finance. Therefore, 
it would be difficult to see how climate finance is allocated objectively to the conditional and 
unconditional target. Discussants agreed that an activity should in general not go into a sector 
that is earmarked for climate finance. It was further suggested that if the host country is fully 
aware and benefits from the mitigation outcomes to achieve its NDC, it should be focused on 
this and not so much on the distinction between its unconditional and conditional NDC target. 
Several discussants stressed their preference of having fewer credits over facing large uncer-
tainty. 
As mentioned above, host countries might increasingly use positive lists for automatic addi-
tionality at the national level. By adopting positive lists, countries have more clarity and con-
trol on the voluntary cooperation. Moreover, positive lists send a clear and early signal to 
potential investors and project developers.  
In the international climate policy arena, the development of positive – and negative lists- has 
traditionally followed a top-down approach (e.g., CDM positive lists). Examples of positive lists 
developed at a national level can be found in domestic offset systems such as the Alberta 
Emission Offset system and the California Compliance Offset Program. Under the PA, no clear 
guidance exists, but it is very likely that international carbon market transactions will rely on 
positive lists developed by host countries in the future. Steps in this direction can already be 
found. For example, Peru is currently developing a national framework for eligible mitigation 
outcome activities, including a positive list of technologies and/or subsectors.  
Additionality determination and baseline setting methodologies 
CMM-WG 
26 
In contrast to the CDM and voluntary carbon markets, positive lists under the PA do not have 
an overarching goal reducing transaction cost for additionality determination. Positive lists 
need to consider additional objectives such as not undermining NDC achievements. Also, the 
unconditional and conditional NDC targets require positive lists to have different considera-
tions towards them. Moreover, the criteria to be used by host countries to arrive at a positive 
list will vary depending on if it aims to be used for Article 6.2 or Article 6.4 activities. 
The frequent updating process of positive lists for additionality is pivotal to avoid that envi-
ronmental integrity is undermined. The update process of national-level positive lists can be 
more flexible than internationally agreed upon ones; a frequent update process under the 
Article 6.4 SB might be difficult to achieve. Fixed intervals linked to NDC implementation pe-
riods, and the establishment of predetermined rules could be introduced to achieve a certain 
level of predictability for activity developers. Updating-related rules could follow a technol-
ogy-specific approach. Well-established and mature technologies with an advanced penetra-
tion rate that form part of a positive list should be subject to a more frequent updating process 
(~3 years) than technologies with a low penetration rate (e.g., e-mobility in Africa). Moreover, 
the updating process could be triggered by thresholds (e.g., applicable as long as penetration 
rate is below a threshold, not applicable thereafter; applicable until relevant regulation is in-
troduced). Thresholds should be based on publicly available data that activity developers can 
check. 
However, retroactive applications to already registered activities should be avoided to provide 
predictability for activity developers. A remaining question in this context is whether such a 
bottom-up approach to positive lists will require international oversight, and if yes, what de-
gree of it would be needed. Regarding Article 6.2, independent auditors and a robust and 
comprehensive Article 6 technical expert review can enhance trust in the integrity of the pos-
itive list. Under the A6.4M., it is essential that national positive lists are aligned with principles 
and rules for positive lists established by the international body. Also, a positive list would 
most probably have to be approved by the A6.4SB. 
Many host country government representatives participating in the host country workshop 
expressed approval for the development of positive lists for certain activity types at the na-
tional level in order to steer private investment in the right direction. One host country repre-
sentative shared experience from the ongoing consideration of a positive list. It was empha-
sised that a participatory process is vital when developing the positive list, including sub-na-
tional governments but also non-state actors as this provides clarity on a sector’s composition 
and needs. Criteria which play an important role in the development of the positive list and 
that go beyond additionality considerations include an activity’s promotion of sustainable de-
velopment and the existence of safeguards against detrimental effects on the environment. 
The need for stakeholder consultation in the process was further stressed by another host 
country representative as well as the need for clear institutional arrangements in terms of an 
authority guiding the entire process. Another participant noted that the development of pos-
itive lists should ideally be aligned with the country’s NDC, thereby identifying priority sectors 
and high-hanging fruit, meaning technologies with high abatement costs. Reflecting on the 
challenging experience with determining activity-specific pay-back periods in additionality 
tests, one person reinforced the idea of positive lists being a useful tool. However, the need 
to regularly update positive lists was mentioned by one participant, as well as the need for 
capacity building.  
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5.2.2. Baseline setting by host countries 
In the PA context, the host country’s role in developing baseline methodologies will be more 
pronounced than in the Kyoto context, due to the difficulties of finding one-size-fits-all ap-
proaches to consider mitigation targets in a context of heterogeneous NDCs. This section looks 
at the incentives an active role in methodology development for baseline setting could offer 
the host country and how the benefits can be further increased.  
Next to receiving carbon finance for mitigation activities with higher abatement costs, the host 
country’s primary interest in the context of market-based cooperation should be the safe-
guarding of NDC achievement. A stringent approach to baseline setting is therefore in the 
interest of the host country. The safeguarding of stringent approaches has also implications 
for the buyer country/entity as a stringent baseline implies lower numbers of credits to the 
buyer as the difference between the crediting baseline and the ’real’ baseline is retained by 
the host country. The lower credit volume represents a disincentive for project developers 
which is why it is advisable to introduce another financial incentive. Either the host country 
itself ‘pays’ for the lower volume as it receives an own share of mitigation outcomes or the 
buyer does not only pay its own share but also subsidises the host country share through 
higher ITMO prices. In fact, also the buyer country/entity should have an interest in the host 
country achieving its NDC despite its Article 6 cooperation. Therefore, the sharing of mitiga-
tion outcomes and associated costs is currently discussed in many Article 6 piloting efforts. 
Another implication of stringent baseline setting is that a good balance needs to be sought 
between stringency and provision of sufficient incentives to ensure the promotion of technol-
ogies that raise ambition in the host country. Host countries could for example prescribe the 
use of dynamic elements in baseline methodologies to ensure that the baseline declines in 
congruence with the expected level of increased ambition in its NDC revision. 
During workshop discussions, it was noted that host countries could promote Article 6 coop-
eration by deconstructing NDC targets into detailed implementation plans at sectoral, sub-
sectoral or even activity-level. This could inform where and how Article 6 cooperation could 
complement NDC implementation and serve as a basis for an Article 6 implementation plan. 
Article 6 cooperation could thus incentivise enhancements of the granularity of NDC imple-
mentation plans.  
The CBDR-RC principle can be integrated in baseline setting methodologies. The Article 6.4 
negotiation texts make it clear that the consideration of the respective national context is an 
important principle (UNFCCC 2019a; UNFCCC 2019b). As discussed in chapter 4, Michaelowa 
et al. (2021b) propose that the PA-aligned pathways should not look the same for each coun-
try. On the contrary, industrialised countries should reach net zero earlier than developing 
countries, the crediting baseline would thus fall more rapidly in the case of industrialised coun-
tries. The determination of the ambition coefficient should thereby not be based on countries’ 
LT-LEDS as they are very diverse and often do not provide a clear pathway. Instead, fair emis-
sions pathways based on different indicators could be developed (Michaelowa et al. 2021b): 
➢ Gross National Income per capita 
➢ Cumulated historical emissions 
➢ Mitigation potential 
➢ Geographic criteria 
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There is a broad number of different criteria to be chosen from a rich academic literature on 
fair an ambitious contribution and resulting emissions paths for different country groups and 
countries. It needs to be noted though that some LDCs also have relatively ambitious NDCs, 
while there are also non-ambitious countries relative to their development status. Therefore, 
the integration of the CBDR-RC principle should also consider the link to the communicated 
NDCs and the nature of the target in terms of its conditionality. 
In workshop discussions, in which the ‘ambition coefficient’ was introduced, doubts were 
raised that the concept would be equivalent to apply top-down defined targets to host coun-
tries. It was clarified that the ambition coefficient relates only to baseline setting for market-
based cooperation and has no implications for host country commitments. A host country net-
zero target can be used as a reference if it is equally stringent or more stringent than an equiv-
alent CBDR-RC aligned target year.  
In the case of Article 6.2 cooperative approaches, the host country can introduce a number of 
conditions for baseline methodologies before granting approval and the authorisation of 
ITMO transfers. The country can thus put an emphasis on ensuring that methodologies are 
aligned with host country targets, plans, policies and priorities. Technology-specific baseline 
approaches such as BAT or other performance benchmarks can for example be stipulated if 
the host country wants to restrict the scope of market-based cooperation to the ‘middle-hang-
ing’ and ‘high-hanging fruit’. It can also prescribe the use of more stringent baselines for mit-
igation activities in order to use a share of the mitigation outcomes towards its own NDC tar-
gets. In general, it would be important that the host country establishes precise conditions 
and communicates them transparently to interested buyers.  
Under Article 6.4, the host country can also play an important role at the approval stage of 
Article 6.4 activities. As mentioned above, the designated national authority can communicate 
to the SB prior to participating in the mechanism what requirements it has regarding baseline 
approaches for activities the country hosts.  
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6. Conclusions for operationalising Article 6 methodologies 
Environmental integrity is the key principle underpinning international carbon markets. There 
will not be relevant demand for emission credits if their environmental integrity is doubtful. 
Article 6 cooperation will be undertaken in two ways, one devoid of and one subject to inter-
national oversight. Experiences from the Kyoto Mechanisms show significant risks to environ-
mental integrity in a situation where international oversight is absent. Therefore, it is imper-
ative to ensure credible and robust approaches for additionality determination and baseline 
setting, particularly under Article 6.2.  
While, under the PA, all countries make mitigation contributions through NDCs, there is no 
guarantee that these NDCs do not generate ‘hot air’. Thus, additionality testing remains criti-
cal in a PA context. We suggest a threefold approach to additionality testing. Financial addi-
tionality relates to the economic attractiveness of the activity, regulatory additionality to the 
characteristics of mitigation policies introduced by the host country and target additionality 
to the characteristics of the emissions target enshrined in the NDC or LT-LEDS. In the context 
of Article 6-related upscaling of mitigation, it is necessary to develop robust approaches for 
additionality testing of mitigation policy instruments; these can involve both financial and reg-
ulatory components. The currently fashionable approach of assessing the ‘vulnerability’ of ac-
tivities to a discontinuation of revenues from emissions credit sales cannot substitute addi-
tionality testing, as vulnerability testing can only be applied ex-post, whereas additionality 
testing needs to be done ex-ante. Positive lists can be a powerful tool to reduce transaction 
costs for additionality determination, but need to be carefully kept up to date as otherwise 
they will become highly problematic when mitigation technologies become mature and 
cheaper. 
Baseline determination under Article 6 clearly needs to go beyond BAU approaches applied 
under the Kyoto Mechanisms. Operationalizing this can be done by applying both short- and 
long-term solutions. Short-term solutions include taking into account existing and planned 
policies in the baseline, as well as the NDC target. Long-term solutions include a discount fac-
tor, a so-called ‘ambition coefficient’ to align the baseline with a net zero emission path con-
sistent with the long-term target of the PA. National level ambition coefficients need to be in 
line with the CBDR principle. Generally, baselines need to become more dynamic, while en-
suring a minimum level of certainty for activity developers. Performance benchmarks, includ-
ing BAT approaches, can play a role in certain sectors but clearly are no panacea. 
The role of host countries in approving activities and authorising ITMO transfers means that 
they will also have a relevant task to ensure additionality and credibility of baselines, particu-
larly under Article 6.2. Countries should strive to align additionality principles and baseline 
setting with their NDC and LT-LEDS development and implementation processes. Obviously, 
capacity building will play a key role to enable poorer countries to fulfil such a role. 
  




Ahonen, Hanna-Mari; Hoch, Stephan; Michaelowa, Axel; Espelage, Aglaja (2020): Accelerat-
ing the implementation of Article 6 through programmes and upscaled crediting, CMM-
WG background paper 07/2020, Version 2, Perspectives Climate Research, Freiburg 
Cames, D. M., Harthan, D. R., Füssler, D. J., Lazarus, M., Lee, C. M., Erickson, P., & Spalding-
Fecher, R. (2016). How additional is the Clean Development Mechanism? DG Clima, Ber-
lin 
ECBI (2018): Pocket Guide To NDCs under the UNFCCC (2018), https://pubs.iied.org/sites/de-
fault/files/pdfs/migrate/G04320.pdf (accessed May 4, 2021) 
Gillenwater, Michael (2012): What is additionality? Part 1: A long standing problem (Discus-
sion Paper No. 001), Silver Spring, GHG Management Institute, Washington 
Gold Standard (2021): How will ongoing financial need (OFN) work? Is it the same as addi-
tionality?, https://www.goldstandard.org/resources/faqs (accessed on May 4, 2021) 
Hermwille, Lukas; Obergassel, Wolfgang (2018): Additionality après Paris Stronghold for En-
vironmental Integrity?, JIKO Policy Paper No. 01/2018, Wuppertal 
Hermwille, Lukas (2020): Reconciling pretensions and reality – the situation-ambition ap-
proach for dynamic baselines under Article 6.4. No. 01/2020. JIKO Policy Paper, Wupper-
tal 
Kollmuss, Anja; Schneider, Lambert; Zhezherin, Vladislav (2015): Has joint implementation 
reduced GHG emissions? Lessons learned for the design of carbon market mechanisms, 
SEI Working Paper No. 2015-07, Stockholm Environment Institute, Stockholm 
Kreibich, Nicolas; Obergassel, Wolfgang (2018): New paths to policy crediting? Challenges 
and opportunities of policy-based cooperation under Article 6 of the Paris Agreement, 
JIKO Policy Paper 04/2018, Wuppertal 
Lo Re, Luca; Ellis, Jane; Vaidyula, Manasvini; Prag, Andrew (2019): Designing the Article 6.4 
mechanism: assessing selected baseline approaches and their implications, Climate 
Change Expert Group, Paper No. 2019 (5), Paris 
Michaelowa, Axel (2009): Interpreting the additionality of CDM projects: Changes in addi-
tionality definitions and regulatory practices over time, in: Oxford Scholarship Online, 
Freestone and Streck (ed.), Legal aspects of carbon trading: Kyoto, Copenhagen, and be-
yond, University Press, Oxford, p. 1-22 
Michaelowa, A.; Butzengeiger, S. (2017): Ensuring additionality under Art. 6 of the Paris 
Agreement. Discussion Paper, Perspectives Climate Group, Freiburg 
Michaelowa, Axel; Hermwille, Lukas; Obergassel, Wolfgang; Butzengeiger, Sonja (2019): Ad-
ditionality revisited: guarding the integrity of market mechanisms under the Paris Agree-
ment, Climate Policy, 19:10, p. 1211-1224 
Michaelowa, A.; Brescia, D.; Wohlgemuth, N.; Galt, H.; Espelage, A.; Moreno, L. (2020a): 
CDM method transformation - updating and transforming CDM methods for use in an 
Article 6 context. Background Paper, Perspectives Climate Research, Freiburg 
Additionality determination and baseline setting methodologies 
CMM-WG 
31 
Michaelowa, A.; Espelage, A.; Müller, B. (2020b): Negotiation cooperation under Article 6 of 
the Paris Agreement – Update for negotiators after COP25, European Capacity Building 
Initiative, Oxford 
Michaelowa, Axel; Ahonen, Hanna-Mari; Espelage, Aglaja (2021a): Setting crediting baselines 
under Article 6 of the Paris Agreement, CMM-WG Discussion Paper, Freiburg  
Michaelowa, Axel; Michaelowa, Katharina; Hermwille, Lukas; Espelage, Aglaja (2021b): To-
wards net zero: Dynamic baselines for international market mechanisms. CIS Working 
Paper No. 107, Zurich 
Schmitz, Simon; Michaelowa, Axel (2005): Kyoto Institutions: Baselines and bargaining under 
Joint Implementation, Environmental Politics, p. 83-102 
Schneider, Lambert; Broekhoff, Derik; Füssler, Jürg; Lazarus, Michael; Michaelowa, Axel; 




Sharma, Anju; Michaelowa, Axel; Espelage, Aglaja; Allan, Jennifer; Müller, Benito (2020): 
COP25 key outcomes, European Capacity Building Initiative, Oxford 
Shishlov, I., & Bellassen, V. (2012). Ten lessons from ten years of the Clean Development 
Mechanism,CDC Climat, Paris 
Spalding-Fecher, R., Kohli, A., Fuessler, J., Broekhoff, D., & Schneider, L. (2020, August). Prac-
tical strategies to avoid over-selling under Article 6. Retrieved from Carbon Mechanisms: 
https://www.carbon-mechanisms.de/fileadmin/media/bilder/Presentation-Randall-
Spalding-Fecher_reducing-overselling-risks.pdf 
UNFCCC (1998): Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change, UNFCCC, Bonn (accessed April 24, 2021) 
UNFCCC (2002): Report of the Conference of the Parties on its seventh session, held at Mar-
rakesh from 29 October to 10 November 2001, FCCC/CP/2001/13, Bonn 
UNFCCC (2005): CDM EB 22 Report. Annex 3 
UNFCCC (2012): Information note on proposed draft guidelines for determination of baseline 
and additionality thresholds for standardized baselines using the performance penetra-
tion approach, CDM-MP58-A20, Bonn 
UNFCCC (2012b): Methodological tool, tool for the demonstration and assessment of addi-
tionality, tool 01, version 07.0.0, clean development mechanism, Bonn 
UNFCCC (2013): Application of E+/E- policies for the investment analysis demonstration of 
additionality, CDM EB 73, Bonn  
UNFCCC (2016a): Review of the joint implementation guidelines: Draft conclusions proposed 
by the Chair, FCCC/SBI/2016/L8, Annex, Bonn 
UNFCCC (2016b): Synthesis report on the aggregate effect of INDCs, https://unfccc.int/pro-
cess/the-paris-agreement/nationally-determined-contributions/synthesis-report-on-
Additionality determination and baseline setting methodologies 
CMM-WG 
32 
the-aggregate-effect-of-intended-nationally-determined-contributions (accessed on May 
5, 2021) 
UNFCCC (2018): Further guidance in relation to the mitigation section of decision 1/CP.21, 
Decision 4/CMA.1, UNFCCC, Bonn 
UNFCCC (2019a): Draft text on matters relating to Article 6 of the Paris Agreement - Rules, 
modalities and procedures for the mechanism established by Article 6, paragraph 4, of 
the Paris Agreement. Version 1 of 13 December 11:45, UNFCCC COP 25, Madrid  
UNFCCC (2019b): Draft text on matters relating to Article 6 of the Paris Agreement - Rules, 
modalities and procedures for the mechanism established by Article 6, paragraph 4, of 
the Paris Agreement. Version 2 of 14 December 9:00, UNFCCC COP 25, Madrid  
UNFCCC (2019c): Draft text on matters relating to Article 6 of the Paris Agreement: Rules, 
modalities and procedures for the mechanism established by Article 6, paragraph 4, of 
the Paris Agreement. Version 3, UNFCCC COP 25, Madrid 
UNFCCC (2019d): Draft text on matters relating to Article 6 of the Paris Agreement: Guid-
ance on cooperative approaches referred to in Article 6, paragraph 2, of the Paris Agree-
ment. Version 3, UNFCCC COP 25, Madrid 
UNFCCC (2021): Initial NDC Synthesis Report, https://unfccc.int/process-and-meetings/the-
paris-agreement/nationally-determined-contributions-ndcs/nationally-determined-con-
tributions-ndcs/ndc-synthesis-report (accessed on May 4, 2021) 
Warnecke, Carsten; Day, Thomas; Scheider, Lambert; Cames, Martin; Healy, Sean; Harthan, 
Ralph; Tewari, Ritika; Höhne, Niklas: Vulnerability of CDM projects for discontinuation of 
mitigation activities: Assessment of project vulnerability and options to support contin-
ued mitigation, DEHSt discussion paper, New Climate and Öko-Institut e.V., Köln and 
Freiburg 
Wooders, Peter; Gass, Philip; Bridle, Richard; Beaton, Christopher; Gagnon-Lebrun, Frédéric; 
Michaelowa, Axel; Hoch, Stephan; Honegger, Matthias; Matsuo, Tyeler; Villa, Vanessa; 
Johnson, Mark; Harries, James (2016): Supporting energy pricing reform and carbon 
pricing policies through crediting, IISD, Geneva 
Additionality determination and baseline setting methodologies 
CMM-WG 
33 
Annex I: The survey 
1. What is your professional background? 
Multiple Choice 
Carbon credit project development 
Carbon credit service provider (e.g. aggregator/intermediary) 
Consulting 
Private sector carbon credit buyer 
Public sector/Government 
Financial sector 




2. How would you judge your level of expertise? 
Low (non-professional interest, recent engagement in carbon markets) 
Medium (some professional experience in carbon markets) 
High (long-standing experience in carbon markets) 
3. Additionality testing is needed for crediting mitigation outcomes that are not cov-
ered by the Nationally Determined Contribution (NDC) of the host country 
Str. Disagree – str. Agree  
4. Additionality testing is needed for crediting mitigation outcomes that are covered 
by the NDC 
Str. Disagree – str. Agree  
5. If you agree that additionality testing is needed for crediting mitigation outcomes, 
then additionality testing should include consideration of: 
Rating each from str. Disagree to str. agree: 
financial barriers      
non-financial barriers      
existing policies      
planned policies      
unconditional NDC targets      
conditional NDC targets      
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market penetration rates 
6. What else should additionality testing consider that has not been asked about so 
far in this survey? 
Open question 
7. Positive lists can be a valuable tool for additionality testing 
Str. Disagree – str. Agree  
8. If you agree that positive lists are a useful tool, then who should develop and ap-
prove positive lists? 
Select: 
Host country 
International body (e.g. Article 6.4 Supervisory Body or standard-setting body) 
Host country should develop and international body should approve 
Other 
9. How often should positive lists be updated? 
Multiple choice: 
Every 3 years 
Every 5 years 
Every 10 years 
In line with NDC implementation periods 
On a case-by-case basis 
Other 
10. Baseline setting should include consideration of existing policies 
Str. Disagree – str. Agree  
11. Baseline setting should include consideration of planned policies 
Str. Disagree – str. Agree  
12. Baseline setting should include consideration of unconditional NDC targets 
Str. Disagree – str. Agree  
13. Baseline setting should include consideration of conditional NDC targets 
Str. Disagree – str. Agree  
14. Baseline setting should include consideration of long-term targets/long-term strat-
egies 
Str. Disagree – str. Agree  
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15. Baseline setting should include consideration of 1.5°C compatible pathways 
Str. Disagree – str. Agree  
16. Baseline setting should contribute to ambition-raising 
Str. Disagree – str. Agree  
17. There should be a default approach to setting crediting baselines in the context of 
the Paris Agreement 
Str. Disagree – str. Agree  
18. Please rate each of the below baseline setting approaches in terms of how appro-
priate they are for crediting in the context of the Paris Agreement 
Rating each from str. Disagree to str. agree: 
Historical emissions     
Business-as-usual emissions     
Below business-as-usual emissions     
Projected emissions associated with unconditional NDC     
Projected emissions associated with conditional NDC     
Benchmarks derived from technology performance     
Benchmarks derived from best available technology 
Other 
19. Existing monitoring methodologies… 
Multiple choice: 
need minor revisions to be applicable in the context of the Paris Agreement. 
need minor revisions to be applicable in the context of the Paris Agreement. 
may need minor or major revisions depending on the methodology to be applicable in the 
context of the Paris Agreement. 
should not be used in in the context of the Paris Agreement. 
Other 
20. Digitalisation can be valuable for: 
Multiple Choice: 
Increasing trust in additionality testing 
Increasing trust in baseline setting 
Increasing trust in monitoring 
Reducing transaction costs of additionality testing 
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Reducing transaction costs of baseline setting 
Accelerating additionality testing process 
Accelerating baseline-setting process 
Accelerating monitoring process 
Other 
21. Which of the following issues should be prioritized in methodology development? 
Multiple choice up to 3 
Assessing the ambition of the host country NDC 
Aligning additionality testing and baseline setting with NDCs 
Policy crediting: baseline setting 
Policy crediting: additionality testing 
Methodologies for nature-based removals (including addressing permanence and leakage) 
Methodologies for technology-based removals (including addressing permanence and leak-
age) 
Positive/negative lists: country-specific 
Positive/negative lists: technology-specific 
Benchmark development: best available technologies 
Benchmark development: performance-based 
other
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Annex II: Summary of the survey results 
As part of the Carbon Market Mechanisms Working Group, a survey was made available on 
LinkedIn for a total of two months, requesting participants’ views on approaches to addition-
ality testing, baseline setting and monitoring for carbon credits under Article 6 of the Paris 
Agreement. The purpose of the survey was to gather a diverse set of opinions from stakehold-
ers in the public and private sector to inform carbon market design under Article 6. All answers 
were kept anonymous. Overall, 68 participants completed the survey, offering a wide range 
of viewpoints on the relevant topics. 
Participant background 
To put opinions in context, survey participants were asked to provide their background. Over-
all, consultants made up the largest proportion of respondents, followed by carbon credit pro-
ject developers and academics. Less represented were members of the financial sector, pri-
vate sector carbon credit buyers and carbon credit service providers. 
 
Figure 1: Professional background of survey participants 
Most participants (57.4%) rated their level of expertise as high, indicating a long-standing pro-
fessional experience in carbon markets. Only 8.8% indicated low expertise (recent engage-
ment in carbon markets), suggesting a respondent pool primarily comprised of experienced 
carbon market consultants and project developers. 
 




The first topic covered in the survey was additionality testing. Participants were asked to rate 
their agreement with the statement, “Additionality testing is needed for crediting mitigation 
outcomes that are not covered by the Nationally Determined Contribution (NDC) of the host 
country.” The average rating was 4 out of 5, “agree”, indicating a strong preference for addi-
tionality testing among respondents. 39.7% selected “strongly agree” and only 2 participants 
“strongly disagreed”. 
Next, participants were asked whether additionality testing is needed for crediting mitigation 
outcomes that are covered by the NDC. Again, the average answer was “agree”, with 32.3% 
of participants “strongly agreeing”. 
Those that agreed were then asked to rate the importance of factors that should be taken into 
consideration (such as financial barriers, existing policies, conditional NDC targets, etc.). The 
consensus here was less clear, with all suggestions receiving a score of at least 3.22 (neutral). 
The option with the highest score was existing policies (4.03—agree). Other than this factor, 
none of the suggestions received high enough averages to suggest an overall positive opinion. 
One respondent who opposed taking planned policies into consideration noted that planned 
policies often take a while to set into action or are never implemented, while consideration 
would block action. Multiple suggestions were made to streamline additionality tests as much 
as possible, making them clear and easy to implement. Many participants felt that factors such 
as market penetration and non-financial barriers are subjective and can be easily manipulated 
to portray additionality. As a solution, several respondents noted that baselines are the clear-
est way to approach crediting. 
Then, an open-ended question was posed for additional comments, which half of participants 
responded to. Overall, there was consensus that additionality testing should be simplified as 
much as possible, as previously mentioned, to avoid creating unnecessary barriers for devel-
oping countries.  Some respondents questioned whether additionality testing is still a concept 
that makes sense, though the majority were in favour of this mechanism. 
Positive lists 
Building on the concept of additionality testing, respondents were asked whether or not pos-
itive lists can be a valuable tool for such testing. The average answer was 4 out of 5, “agree”, 
with only four participants strongly disagreeing. Comments were added pointing out that pos-
itive lists should be nationally/regionally tailored and regularly updated. 
Next, participants were asked who should develop and approve positive lists. 42.9% of re-
spondents agreed that host countries should develop their own positive lists, which would 
then be approved by international bodies. Another 33.3% believed that an international body 
should be solely responsible. Only 9.5% agreed that the host country should develop the list 
on its own. 




Figure 2: Positive list development and approval preferences 
The next relevant question is how often positive lists should be updated. Here, the opinions 
were quite diverse, with approximately a quarter selecting every three years, another quarter 
favouring every five years, and other significant percentages choosing to update in line with 
NDC implementation periods or on a case-by-case basis. All participants felt that updating 
every 10 years would be too infrequent, however. Several of the participants that selected 
“other” felt that updates should be aligned with advancement in technology or other bench-
marks. 
Baseline setting 
Another issue that respondents largely agreed on was the consideration of existing policies in 
baseline setting. 50% “strongly agreed” that existing policies should be taken into account, 
while 37.9% “agreed”.  Only three participants disagreed with the statement. 
There was slightly less consensus on the issue of planned policies. More than half of respond-
ents agreed or strongly agreed that planned policies should be considered, but the group was 
less convinced on this topic than consideration of existing policies. The disagreement primarily 
stemmed from the uncertainty of whether or not planned policies would actually be imple-
mented in the short term. For this reason, some participants felt that only existing policies 
should be considered. In the words of one participant, “planned policies are as good as non-
existent”. Even those who agreed that planned policies should be considered often included 
comments suggesting that the likelihood of such policies being enacted be taken into account. 
Over 70% of respondents agreed that baseline setting should include consideration of uncon-
ditional NDC targets, and 61.8% favoured consideration of conditional NDC targets, as well. 
Similarly, 63.2% agreed that long-term targets and strategies should be considered, with a 
small fraction disagreeing. Some respondents felt neutrally, noting that final outcomes of 
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long-term strategies are uncertain. Overall, many respondents pointed out that long-term 
strategies are dependent on finance, international partnerships, and other variables, and re-
quire individual assessment. Consideration of individual circumstances was a common theme 
throughout responses to many questions. 
A majority of respondents also favoured including consideration of 1.5° C compatible path-
ways, though some answers did point out that this may not be an achievable goal for many 
countries. 
 
Figure 3: Factors to take into account in baseline setting 
The next question asked respondents whether baseline setting should contribute to ambition-
raising. Here, a large proportion (32.3%) felt neutrally, though the majority still agreed. One 
“neutral” respondent noted that many host country targets are already ambitious, and others 
pointed out that the concept of ambition is vague and unclear. Overall, many respondents did 
not feel negatively towards using baselines to raise ambition, but felt that other avenues were 
more effective, such as NDCs. 
Most respondents agreed with the statement, “There should be a default approach to setting 
crediting baselines in the context of the Paris Agreement.” One respondent suggested, “Base-
lines should limit the carbon credits available as a portion of the measured and verified emis-
sion reductions, e.g., 30%.” Other approaches included following a 1.5° C emission reduction 
path or offering a “menu” of agreed approaches (which would ensure consistency but avoid 
one default approach). Overall, there was a consensus that one-size-fits-all approaches should 
be avoided, but clear guidance could be given. Respondents agreed that their answers were 
dependent on what this “default approach” would look like. 
Then, survey participants were asked to rate a selection of baseline setting approaches in 
terms of how appropriate they are for crediting in the context of the Paris Agreement (such 
as historical emissions, projected emissions associated with unconditional NDC, benchmarks 
derived from best available technology, etc). Here, opinions were very skewed, with all 
choices receiving an average score of 2 out of 4 (“appropriate under specific circumstances”). 
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The highest scoring choices were projected emissions associated with unconditional NDC and 
benchmarks derived from best available technology, both with scores of 2.82 out of 4. 
Regarding existing monitoring methodologies, 49.2% of respondents felt that they “may need 
minor or major revisions depending on the methodology to be applicable in the context of the 
Paris Agreement”. The other two popular answers were “need minor revisions to be applica-
ble” (19.4%) and “need major revisions to be applicable” (13.4%). Only 5.9% of respondents 
felt that existing monitoring methodologies should not be used in the context of the Paris 
Agreement. 
The last two questions also displayed a variety of opinions. First, participants were asked what 
goals digitalisation could be useful for. Respondents felt positively about almost all options, 
including increasing trust in baseline setting, trust in monitoring, reducing transaction cost of 
monitoring, and accelerating the monitoring process, showing a clear positive view of digital-
isation in this process. Next, respondents were asked to select issues that should be prioritised 
in methodology development. Again, answers were widely dispersed, with favourites includ-
ing aligning additionality testing and baseline setting with NDCs, country-specific positive/neg-
ative lists, and methodologies for nature-based removals. 
Summary 
Overall, the survey was very useful in assessing views on additionality testing, baseline setting 
and monitoring for carbon credits. Respondents were in favour of additionality testing both 
for crediting mitigation outcomes that were covered and not covered by host country NDCs, 
though there was no clear agreement on exact factors that should be taken into account. 
Above all, respondents felt that additionality testing should be as clear and simple as possible, 
and that positive lists could be a helpful tool, as long as they are nationally and regionally 
tailored. There were split opinions on how often positive lists should be updated, though cer-
tainly more often than every 10 years. As far as baseline setting, a majority of respondents 
agreed that existing policies, planned policies, unconditional and conditional NDC targets, 
long-term targets and 1.5° C compatible pathways should be considered. Though most re-
spondents approved of the idea of a default approach to setting baselines, they felt that these 
guidelines will need to be constructed carefully and without a “one-size-fits-all” approach. 
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